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Abstract: On January 26, 1983, the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) announced that it would require all railroads under its regula-
tory jurisdiction to change from Retirement-Replacement-Betterment 
(RRB) accounting, to a more theoretically sound depreciation ac-
counting for matching revenues and expenses. The change was need-
ed because RRB did not allow for the recapture of track investment, 
leaving the railroads with limited capital to replace aging track lines. 
Over the previous three decades, it had become painfully obvious to 
everyone that the industry’s economic woes were the result of archaic 
accounting procedures that lacked harmony with the rest of American 
accounting standards, but the ICC was reluctant to change until new 
tax legislation in the early 1980s forced the issue. The decision was a 
culmination of a debate that started in the mid-1950s when Arthur 
Andersen, with the help of the securities industry, began an effort 
to harmonize railroad and industry standards using arguments that 
mirror those supporting the international accounting harmonization 
efforts of the early 21st century. 
INTRODUCTION 
 As the globalization of business markets grows, the debate 
over proper accounting standards to meet the needs of cross-
border and cross-cultural investors has grown. This is especially 
true since the reorganization of the international standards-
 setting apparatus in 2001 and the creation of the International 
Accounting Standards Board. Even before the reorganization, 
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the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) had attempt-
ed to harmonize some of U.S. generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) with international principles. For example, 
one of the intentions of SFAS 128, Earnings per Share, was to 
make “computing earnings per share more compatible with EPS 
standards in other countries” [FASB, 1997, para. 1]. Other U.S. 
GAAP that is not yet harmonized lies in the areas of accounting 
for research and development and for inventories. These and 
other accounting standards lack current convergence with in-
ternational GAAP. Though the drive to harmonize international 
standards continues at the forefront of changing accounting 
thought, this debate over diverging accounting standards is not 
a new one.
 Nearly half a century before the current international ac-
counting standards debate, some in the accounting profession, 
led by Arthur Andersen (AA), felt that railroad accounting 
practices required by the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) were rapidly diverging from GAAP and, in 1955, asked for 
a change. It was felt that such a divergence was a major cause 
of the economic hardships facing the U.S. railroad industry. At 
the core of these divergent practices was “betterment account-
ing” or, more theoretically, Retirement-Replacement-Betterment 
(RRB). The ICC had institutionalized the practice in the early 
20th century to account for “track and way structures,” but it 
was rapidly becoming an anachronism in the face of modern 
depreciation rules.
 In brief, AA and its allies felt that the ICC needed to phase 
out RRB in favor of depreciation accounting in an effort to al-
low the capital-starved railroads to recoup investments that, in 
some cases, were more than 50 years old. In addition, AA cited 
problems with comparable financial statements, problematic 
auditing procedures, and clarity as other reasons for the much-
needed change. Ironically, the drive for international standards 
convergence is predicated on some of the same reasoning as 
Andersen’s arguments. 
 The ICC and the American Institute of Accountants (AIA)1 
saw no reason to eliminate the traditional method of track ac-
counting because it tended to keep replacement costs in line 
with inflation. The railroads, however, were much more prag-
1In 1886, the American Association of Public Accountants was formed. This 
organization began publishing the Journal of Accountancy in 1905, changing its 
name to the American Institute of Accountants (AIA) in 1916. In 1957, the organi-
zation became the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). 
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matic. They wanted to keep RRB due to the cost of the change 
and the impact such a change would have on their rate-of-return 
on assets (ROA), the centerpiece of ICC rate-making policy. In 
the face of powerful interests, the ICC refused the change.
 This paper will discuss the efforts by AA and various public-
interest groups to act as change agents to modernize railroad 
accounting principles and bring them into convergence with the 
accounting standards of other industries. The paper focuses on 
the efforts of the ICC to block such moves in light of congres-
sional hearings and pressure from the securities industry. The 
article follows the debate from 1955 to the ICC’s elimination of 
betterment accounting in 1983, using published research, news 
articles, and public documents, including those published by AA 
and the AIA. 
BACKGROUND TO THE DEBATE
Betterment Accounting and the ICC: The process of changing 
from RRB to depreciation accounting for railroad track struc-
tures started nearly fifty years before AA’s intervention. In 1906, 
Congress passed the Hepburn Amendment to the Interstate 
Commerce Act. This amendment provided the ICC with two 
cherished goals – the authority to set rail tariffs and the power 
to require uniform railroad accounting. With this newly found 
authority, the ICC issued revised accounting and reporting regu-
lations. Under the new regulations, railroads were compelled to 
report systematic depreciation charges for equipment and other 
“non-permanent” fixed assets. This new methodology would be 
in lieu of the traditional “betterment” accounting methodology 
used by the rail industry. 
 Betterment accounting or RRB had developed over the 
previous 40-50 years to account for track and equipment. FASB 
[1983, para. 5], at the time of RRB discontinuance in 1983, de-
fined the practice in Statement #73 explaining: 
Under RRB, the initial costs of installing track are capi-
talized, not depreciated, and remain capitalized until 
the track is retired. The costs of replacing track are 
expensed unless a betterment (for example, replacing a 
110-lb. rail with a 132-lb. rail) occurs. In that case, the 
amount by which the cost of the new part exceeds the 
current cost of the part replaced is considered a bet-
terment and is capitalized but not depreciated, and the 
current cost of the part replaced is expensed. Railroads 
generally have used RRB for financial reporting.
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 In essence, the railroad does not recoup the cost of the 
track until replaced. In some years, there would be no charges 
to current operating expenses from track usage if no track was 
replaced. This lack of cost recapture from RRB was indicated 
by the Union Pacific [Moody’s Investors’ Services, 1984, p. 151] 
that reported in 1983: “Under this method, the cost of in-kind 
replacements of track structure was changed to expense when 
incurred. Cost of betterments (improvements) to structure were 
capitalized and charged against earnings only when the asset 
was removed from service.”
 At the time of the 1907 change, the ICC felt that betterment 
accounting simply did not reflect the true cost of the railroad’s 
operations because in lean years there would simply be no re-
placements or upgrades. This policy also resulted in safety con-
cerns for the ICC and the public. With these problems in mind, 
the ICC designed the 1907 change to provide a more accurate 
rendering of these fixed asset balances through a more sys-
tematic matching of fixed expenses with revenue. As expected, 
the orders set off a firestorm of protest from the rail industry 
because it was felt that the ICC had overstepped its bounds and 
had jeopardized the rail industry’s financial well-being. 
 The railroads, however, felt that they were already recogniz-
ing “physical” depreciation of their assets through the replace-
ment process, but the ICC was pushing for a uniform applica-
tion of a relatively new concept called “economic depreciation.” 
Over the next six years, the industry attempted to get the order 
changed through public protests in the press, “civil disobedi-
ence” by neglecting to send depreciation reports to the ICC, and 
litigation. In the end, the Supreme Court in Kansas City South­
ern Railway v. U.S. [231 U.S. 423] would rule in 1913 that the 
ICC had the authority and jurisdiction to compel such reporting. 
According to AA, the court indicated that depreciation was “an 
inevitable fact which no system of accounts can properly ignore” 
[AA, 1962a, p. 128]. Though the ICC issued the equipment depre-
ciation orders to provide more uniformity in reporting railroad 
income, the ruling ironically affected each railroad differently, 
depending on its location, age, condition of its equipment, and 
maintenance schedules.2 Facing these logistical problems, the 
ICC compromised and did not order depreciation charges for 
track structures. By so doing, it institutionalized RRB for track 
structures as part of the Uniform System of Accounts, adopted 
by the ICC in 1914. In the end, the railroads lost on depreciating 
2See Delano [1908] for a further discussion of this problem.
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equipment but won on RRB for track and other structures, by 
far their largest asset.
 The debate over RRB for track accounting began again in 
1924 with the ICC issuing new preliminary orders for the rail-
roads to begin depreciating “permanent” fixed assets. At this 
point, the railroads were now “bucking” established business 
practices. Depreciation accounting for fixed assets came into 
widespread use in most U.S. industries at the turn of the cen-
tury, especially after the advent of federal income taxes. The ICC 
now wanted the railroads to depreciate track structures and take 
an annual charge to match revenues and expenses better. The 
railroads protested the ICC’s decision. By 1932, a poor economy 
forced the ICC to relent and continue to allow RRB for track 
structures. Continued debate was put on hold for the next 20 
years due to the Great Depression and World War II.
A Change in Economic Reality: By the 1950s, the railroads had 
to recognize a new economic reality in the U.S. with new trans-
portation alternatives for travel and shipping. A fledgling airline 
industry had introduced pressurized cabins, making air travel 
more appealing to the traveling public. Cheap energy fueled 
the country’s love of the automobile, and the newly announced 
interstate highway system began to hurt rail passenger service. 
With better roads and cheap energy, an expanding and cost-effi-
cient trucking industry negatively impacted shipping, the “bread 
and butter” of the railroad’s business. 
 The trucking industry was more cost-effective for shippers 
currently servicing smaller towns with “high cost,” short-line 
railroads, spurs off the more lucrative main-stem routes. This 
change placed pressure on rail revenues, causing the railroads 
to request abandonment of these unprofitable routes as well as 
a general reduction in maintenance and replacements of track 
structures. These economic problems facing the industry soon 
lead to renewed questioning of the RRB system of track ac-
counting. Safety concerns aside, this practice led inevitably to 
either artificially high income or low rates of return given no 
recapture of capital cost. 
 In addition to these new economic realities for the rail 
industry, the Internal Revenue Code in 1954 codified the use of 
accelerated depreciation charges for tax purposes. Because the 
Code still allowed companies to use straight-line depreciation 
for purposes of corporate reporting, the change had the effect 
of creating temporary tax differences for book income and tax 
income, requiring a deferred taxes disclosure to corporate share-
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holders. The ICC banned the use of deferred tax reporting for all 
companies under its jurisdiction, reasoning that it only allowed 
straight-line depreciation accounting for regulatory reporting, 
making it unnecessary for the railroads to deal with accelerated 
methods and interperiod tax allocations.
 By the mid-1950s, these conflicting betterment accounting 
rules for some of America’s largest corporations were viewed 
by some in the public accounting profession to be at variance 
with current GAAP rules and, consequently, at variance with the 
matching principle.3 Over the next three decades, a number of 
powerful special-interest groups and governmental organiza-
tions would array against betterment accounting with the ICC 
and the railroads putting up a spirited, if not misguided, defense 
of its cherished accounting procedure.
CHALLENGES TO RAILROAD ACCOUNTING PRACTICES4
AA Gets Involved: In August 1955, AA petitioned the ICC asking 
it to modify its position on deferred taxes. The CPA firm felt that 
the ICC needed to address this issue because the independent 
auditors might be compelled to issue qualified opinions given 
the lack of formal adherence to GAAP in the areas of depre-
ciation and deferred taxes. The railroads protested the desired 
changes because such tax deferrals threatened to increase 
reported (ICC) income and, in turn, negatively influence a very 
sensitive balance between reported income and return on invest-
ment for rate-review purposes.
 During its regulatory history, the ICC, with the help of court 
rulings, had settled on a basic ROA methodology to determine 
the efficacy of a railroad’s rate structure. Simply put, if the ICC 
felt that the ROA for a given railroad was too high in compari-
son with the industry and competition, it might well rule that 
the railroad needed to cut its passenger or freight rates. Unfor-
tunately, the ICC often ignored the opposite condition, denying 
rate relief to railroads that missed their target returns. The ICC 
thought that this odd regulatory process was for the public good 
regardless of its impact on the cash flow of the railroad or future 
3The Committee on Accounting Procedure had promulgated several Account-
ing Research Bulletins over the previous ten years related to the issue of depre-
ciation charges. The first, in May 1944, was ARB 22, Report of Committee on Ter­
minology, which defined depreciation as “a system of accounting which aims to 
distribute the cost … of a tangible asset, less salvage value over the estimated 
useful life of the unit…in a systematic and rational manner” [AIA, 1944, p. 179].
4Much of this section is derived from AA [1960, 1962a, b, 1969, 1973, 1976].
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equipment replacement needs. Because of the ICC’s regulatory 
theory, a railroad did not want its track structures subject to de-
preciation charges because they would lower asset balances and 
a corresponding increase in ROA. This myopic view of opera-
tions ignored the obvious purpose of depreciation, to recapture 
costs for track replacements. They did seem to understand that, 
due to inflation, any replacements would offset any correspond-
ing reductions in net assets. In the end, the regulators agreed 
with the powerful railroads and announced in December 1956, 
that it would not modify its Uniform System of Accounts to in-
corporate interperiod tax allocations [WSJ, 1956, p. 2].
Leonard Spacek and the AIA Committee: In the meantime, the 
securities industry also became alarmed with the problems re-
lated to railroad accounting and formally began to study the is-
sue. Corbin [1957, p. 86], quoting the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), 
said, “a current [AICPA] study was instigated by the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) after consultation with the [ICC]. The 
exchange apparently fears that stockholders are being misled by 
income figures derived from the present accounting methods.” 
 To gain a better understanding of the issues, the NYSE 
asked the American Institute of Accountants (AIA) to form the 
Committee on Relations with the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion in mid-1956 to inquire into “clearing the principal diver-
gencies between accounting practices of railroads and generally 
accepted accounting principles for other industries” [Journal of 
Accountancy, 1957b, p. 69, 1957a]. In the same article, a mem-
ber of this committee, AA’s Leonard Spacek, felt that these 
divergencies between railroad accounting and GAAP resulted in 
the “overstatement of current income and inaccurate property 
accounting.” Spacek charged that railroad officials pressured 
the AIA committee to make sure that “no recommendations are 
made which would affect the railroad companies adversely from 
the standpoint of regulation or income.” During the forthcoming 
congressional hearings, an ICC official would bring more “pub-
lic pressure to bear by indicating dire consequences if either 
depreciation accounting or inter-period tax allocations were 
instituted.” The WSJ [1957, p. 6] quoted Spacek as saying that 
he felt “the proposed accounting change would slash reported 
income by 20% and lead to higher rates.” 
 Though the AIA felt the change was unwarranted, it did get 
the attention of members of a House Congressional Subcommit-
tee that held hearings on the issue at the end of April 1957 after 
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the AIA committee had issued its report.5 In summary, the AIA 
committee6 [AA, 1962b, pp. 22-23] listed six specific procedures 
of ICC accounting that were at variance with GAAP procedures 
– (1) a number of items that would normally be deferred charges 
or credits are reported as expenses on ICC income statements; 
(2) appropriations to such accounts as sinking funds are consid-
ered expenses under ICC accounting rules; (3) only income taxes 
paid are recognized with no interperiod tax allocations; (4) rail-
roads are not required to provide a disclosure of the current por-
tion of long-term debts; (5) an acquisition adjustment account is 
used in lieu of separate fixed asset accounts; and (6) outstanding 
vouchers are considered liabilities rather than an offset to cash. 
Concerning each of these items, an AICPA Committee did make 
the judgment that, “As a result [of economic changes in the 
industry], the principles of determining and reporting annual 
income to the railroad investors differ materially from those fol-
lowed by other industries” [AA, 1962b, p. 5]. 
 The AICPA committee, however, left the most contentious 
issue, betterment accounting, for the final part of its discussion. 
The committee report began this section by noting that the ICC 
had studied this issue of depreciation versus betterment during 
World War II and had required depreciation of certain proper-
ties such as buildings and other structures,7 but that with con-
tinued railroad protests, it left betterment accounting practices 
intact for track structures. In a surprise to the CPA firms, the 
AICPA committee concluded that betterment accounting, though 
not in accord with GAAP, had a substantial authoritative basis 
and, consequently, there was no need to change to depreciation 
accounting. In defense of its position on track accounting, the 
committee [AA, 1962a, p. 125] wrote: 
… in consideration of the long history of use of replace-
ment accounting by railroads with respect thereto, the 
unique nature of this category of railroad property, its 
relatively stable physical quantity, and the mature eco-
5The congressional probe included hearings from April 30 to May 3, 1957 by 
the Legal and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee of the House Committee on Govern-
ment Operations. The probe itself was wide ranging but focused primarily on the 
depreciation and tax allocation issues. The Journal of Accountancy [1957b] pub-
lished an executive summary of the 292-page report in November 1957. The full 
range of the issues and arguments presented are beyond the scope of this paper. 
6The AIA Committee Report was issued on March 28, 1957 and was published 
in the Journal of Accountancy [1957a] in May 1957.
7According to Boberg [1985, p. 19], the ICC required this change on June 8, 
1942. 
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nomic status of the industry, has concluded, … that no 
substantial useful purpose would be served by a change 
to depreciation accounting techniques in absence of 
evidence indicating that depreciation-maintenance pro-
cedures would provide a more appropriate charge to 
income for the use of such property. 
 The AICPA committee essentially agreed with the railroad 
industry and the ICC. In doing so, it developed a much broader 
definition of authoritative GAAP that now had its basis in histor-
ical precedent and industry usage regardless of the method’s the-
oretical or practical basis. This was a more utilitarian approach 
to the way accounting principles developed and ran counter to 
the trend of developing a body of accounting principles based 
on postulates and assumptions. The AICPA would eventually at-
tempt to institutionalize the criteria as a basis for authoritative 
GAAP in its 1965 publication of Accounting Research Study No. 
7, Inventory of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles for Busi­
ness Enterprises. 
 The congressional committee’s responding summary [AA, 
1962b, pp. 39-40] took exception to the AICPA’s stance on RRB, 
but overall its reaction was mixed. On the one hand, the com-
mittee actually commended the ICC for putting the RRB issue 
on its agenda for study. But the congressional committee also 
vociferously complained about the ICC’s “intransigence” in re-
fusing to allow deferred taxes. In 1959, the ICC did make some 
changes related to the accounting variances listed by the AICPA 
but left intact RRB and its ban on deferred tax allocations. In 
the case of deferred taxes, the ICC again felt that since it re-
quired that only straight-line depreciation be used for account-
ing purposes, “only the actual tax payable need be recorded or 
a significant misstatement of current income can result because 
total tax would be the same under either method” [AA, 1962b, p. 
10]. AA and the accounting profession had lost this round with 
the ICC on accounting issues, but the debate between AA and 
the Institute would continue for some time to come. 
 In another challenge to the ICC in July 1958, Spacek and AA 
inquired about the validity of the special language included in 
the auditor’s report for ICC-regulated companies.8 They felt that 
8The audit report language read: “In our opinion the accompanying balance 
sheet and statements of income and retained earnings present fairly the position 
of the company and results of its operations for the year, in conformity with ac-
counting principles and practices prescribed or authorized by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, applied on a basis consistent with that of the previous year” 
[Spacek, 1969, p. 510]. 
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it did not fully comply with the ethics rule 5(e) of the Code of 
Professional Conduct. In a flurry of letters between the firm and 
the AICPA ethics committee, a brisk debate ensued with AA stat-
ing: “We have long questioned whether this form of the auditors 
certificate is acceptable under rule 5(e) … since it does not say 
whether the financial statements are in conformity with gener-
ally accepted accounting principles” [Spacek, 1969, p. 503]. In 
response to AA’s inquiry, on March 23, 1959, the AICPA’s ethics 
committee reaffirmed the current language of the auditor’s re-
port and did not require an explanation of the deviation between 
railroad accounting and GAAP because the accounting treatment 
had a legal or authoritative basis as prescribed by the ICC. The 
report went on to say that “the Institute’s Auditing Procedures 
Committee has not spoken specifically on reports of railroads. … 
[and] … In absence of some authoritative statement prescribing 
the reporting standards for what has been concluded is a special 
reporting problem, the validity of any reporting practice must 
rest on general use and general acceptance” [Spacek, 1969, p. 
510]. The language would remain for another 25 years.
 Again, AA’s desire for change in railroad reporting require-
ments was stymied, but the firm laid down some general prin-
ciples in the process. First, the firm saw a need to make railroad 
audit reports understandable and transparent to users. Second, 
it felt the need to harmonize both accounting and auditing 
standards. 
 With two setbacks now, AA took a new approach in deal-
ing with the ICC-GAAP variance problems by asking the ICC to 
allow the railroads and other regulated companies to publish 
statements in accordance with GAAP while continuing to use 
ICC Uniform Account rules for ICC reporting. The ICC balked at 
the proposal at first and issued a preliminary rule in December 
1959 ordering that no ICC-reporting company could issue any 
type of financial statements that varied from ICC accounting 
rules. The proposed rule generated huge opposition from the 
accounting profession, securities regulators, and the NYSE. 
The regulators and the accounting firms felt that the ICC was 
attempting to exercise powers over railroad securities transac-
tions never intended by the Interstate Commerce Act, an area of 
concern skirted by the congressional hearing. With the excep-
tion of the railroads, most other ICC-regulated companies, such 
as trucking and bus lines, protested the proposed rules because 
of the difficulty they would face in securing both debt and eq-
uity financing in the markets without GAAP financial statements 
matching revenues and expenses. 
10
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 In the face of the protest from all quarters, the ICC rescind-
ed its preliminary rule two years later in January 1962. A new 
rule allowed ICC-regulated companies to elect to publish GAAP 
financial statements with the caveat that they must make a 
footnote disclosure of the differences in income reported under 
GAAP and the ICC Uniform Accounting System. They, of course, 
were still required to report to the ICC using the Uniform Ac-
counting System. As will be reported later, few ICC railroads 
took advantage of the new financial reporting practices options 
because they would have to maintain two, possibly three, sets of 
books. Even with the compromise, this round of the deprecia-
tion debate had ended in a draw. The CPA firms had won some 
reporting concessions; other regulated companies had gained 
some flexibility in their financial reporting; the ICC had main-
tained its stance on deferred taxes; and, most importantly for 
this story, the railroads continued to use RRB accounting for the 
time being. Except at AA, the issues raised by the debate began 
to fade from the memories of most participants.
Andersen Challenges the AICPA’s Theory: In its 1969 edition of 
its series Accounting and Reporting Problems in the Accounting 
Profession, AA reported that it had renewed the debate over RRB 
with a letter to the AICPA in 1965. The correspondence was an 
attempt to persuade the Institute to reverse its position on bet-
terment accounting. In 1966, the AICPA issued a response to AA. 
In the letter, the AICPA continued to assert that RRB accounting 
had substantial authoritative support (e.g., Accounting Research 
Study No. 7). Though AA’s discussion did not identify the criteria 
on which the AICPA based its opinion, it may have been related 
to the criterion that read: “Each business entity must follow 
generally accepted accounting principles i.e. those which have 
substantial authoritative support in order to obtain an unquali-
fied opinion from certified public accountants” [Grady, 1965, 
pp. 33-34]. Grady explained that accounting entities should, 
“[a] choose the accounting practices and methods of applica-
tion most suitable to the needs and purposes of the entity and 
which,…will most fairly present the financial position and re-
sults of operations, and [b] at the same time, follow accounting 
practices and methods of other business entities.”
 The AICPA had again taken a utilitarian view of betterment 
accounting as it met the needs of the rail industry even though it 
did not harmonize with the growing body of accounting theory. 
The AICPA reiterated its original defense of betterment account-
ing as authoritative. According to Sayers [1979, p. 12], the 
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AICPA defense made the following points: 
•	 It has been used by the railroad industry for many years.
•	 Track components are unique in nature.
•	 There is a relatively stable physical quantity of track in-
dustry-wide.
•	 The industry is mature economically.
•	 Current operating charges under betterment accounting 
approximate those under depreciation accounting given a 
stable program of track maintenance.
 By 1976, AA had chipped away at these “justifications” and 
provided several criticisms of betterment accounting. The first 
was that betterment accounting had acted as an impediment 
to proper tariff rate making. Since rates are based on costs, the 
carrier that deferred maintenance, or did not use depreciation, 
could find itself failing to recoup capital through the railroad 
rates and, correspondingly, not having the capital to replace 
track structures. AA [1976, p. 151] wrote: “Had the railroads 
adopted depreciation accounting for the costs of grading and 
track structures, these costs could have been considered in the 
establishment or railroad rates in the past and been recovered 
through those rates and deducted for income taxes. This recov-
ery of cost would have placed the railroads in a much stronger 
financial position today.”
 In fairness to AA’s arguments, the ICC’s rate setting was an 
inflexible and archaic legal and regulatory structure that did not 
mesh with modern capital management concepts. For example, 
cost behavior theories related to fixed and variable cost func-
tions and operating “economies of scale” were virtually ignored 
by the ICC when determining rail tariff rates. 
 The next criticism dealt with the inconsistent track mainte-
nance and replacements practices of many carriers in contradis-
tinction to a major AICPA justification. Simply put, if a carrier 
elected to defer track maintenance and replacement, there were 
no charges against income for the use of the track in the year of 
deferral.9 Decreased expense levels led to high income and cor-
respondingly higher taxes, a frequent situation in World War II 
when, “railroads were generating substantial revenues but they 
9In a “regulatory irony,” the ICC partially agreed with AA’s position in a 1949 
study cited by the congressional panel. The report read, “… manipulations through 
deferring track work is subject to some limitation because of safety requirements. 
Track in unsafe condition cannot be drawn from service as in the case of equip-
ment. The ICC was treading a thin line by admitting the problem but dismissing 
it as unimportant because no railroad would ever leave its track in that bad of 
condition” [Journal of Accountancy, 1957b, p. 73].
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could not make extensive physical replacements of track struc-
tures due to ‘war shortages.’ Thus, the railroads were placed in 
a position of paying [higher] taxes because the improper ac-
counting procedures utilized failed to recognize the capital costs 
incurred to provide rail service” [AA, 1976, p. 151]. Again, this 
practice seemed to be one of many contradictions in the railroad 
industry’s efforts to maintain or increase ICC tariff rate levels. 
In this case, a higher income probably would have resulted in 
a corresponding increase in the road’s ROA, precluding it from 
getting rate relief. 
 Finally, the “stable physical quantity” justification cited 
above was also no longer valid in light of the elimination or 
abandonment of substantial quantities of existing track. AA felt 
that new technologies (e.g., air and trucking services) limited or 
eliminated the remaining economic life of the track structures. 
AA felt that betterment accounting “has led to misstatements of 
economic fact and have had serious adverse financial repercus-
sions in terms of … the railroad’s ability to maintain its financial 
strength through the recovery of its capital investment, its abil-
ity to determine the cost of providing rail service and therefore 
to have appropriate service rates established” [AA, 1976, p. 148]. 
The firm [AA, 1976, p. 152] further explained: “If depreciation 
that recognizes economic obsolescence is not adopted and if 
replacements are deferred because of an inability to obtain suf-
ficient replacement capital, large amounts of the original capital 
cost of the track structures will remain on the balance sheets 
even though service value of the assets represented by those 
costs is declining.”
 A GAO study [1981, p. 8] also used the AICPA justification 
criteria. The GAO, however, concluded that the economic condi-
tions had changed since 1957, and that betterment accounting 
“gives only a limited and obscure view of the effects of infla-
tion on the railroads because it concerns only a portion of the 
operating cost – costs associated with track structure replace-
ments.” AA pointed out that the massive bankruptcy of the Penn 
Central in 1969 was, in part, due to the problems caused by 
ICC accounting rules that left the railroad with little capital to 
make replacements. Finally, AA [1976, p. 148] indicated that the 
“adoption of depreciation accounting will facilitate management 
decision making in ways including product service pricing and 
financial planning.” 
 Finally, AA [1976, pp. 151-154] went on to list three ben-
efits to depreciation accounting. The first was that depreciation 
accounting would “improve financial reporting, through the 
13
Heier and Gurley: End of betterment accounting: A study of the economic, professional, and regulatory factors that fostered standards convergence in the U.S. railroad industry, 1955-1983
Published by eGrove, 2007
Accounting Historians Journal, June 200738  
consistent and uniform application of these principles over all 
of the railroads, and would be consistent with other industries.” 
Second, AA felt that, “depreciation accounting would facilitate 
proper pricing” through the recovery of fixed costs. Finally, 
“depreciation accounting would improve financial planning” 
because more consideration would be given to the levels of track 
structures needed and corresponding depreciation charges when 
dealing with economic obsolescence of the fixed assets. In the 
end, AA never persuaded the ICC to change either its fixed asset 
accounting policies or its stance on deferred taxes. However, it 
did set the stage for the final series of debates that would spell 
the end of RRB accounting.10
Other Voices: Except for AA’s published arguments against RRB 
and its visible dispute with the AICPA, there was actually a 
dearth of published literature for or against RRB during the 
1960s. This was probably due to the arcane nature of an issue 
everyone assumed had been settled decades ago. By the mid-
1970s, only two prominent articles [Reynolds, 1964; Coleman, 
1970] surfaced from the academic and professional communi-
ties that challenged the status quo.
 
REGULATORY REFORMS
The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act: In 1972, 
AA made one more attempt at changing the mind of the ICC re-
garding its accounting practices. In a December 1972 letter, the 
firm [AA, 1973, p. 73] suggested four benefits justifying an ac-
counting change. The change to depreciation accounting would 
promote uniformity of accounting, foster cost regulation and 
reduce incentives to postpone retirement, improve information 
for regulatory purposes, and reduce the potential for the man-
agement of income.
 This time AA streamlined its arguments and concentrated 
on issues of corporate governance and safety problems within 
the railroad industry. The list appears closely related to the per-
ceived reasons for the Penn Central debacle. Norby [1981, p. 77] 
noted some of these reasons when he explained, “opponents of 
betterment accounting believe that it allows railroad manage-
10As a side note, during the period of time that AA was quarrelling with the 
ICC and the AICPA over the propriety of RRB accounting, the IRS actually was 
bolstering its support for the methodology through the issuance of several rev-
enue rulings. These rulings and other tax issues related to RRB are discussed later 
in the paper.
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ments to overstate income in periods of economic recession by 
curtailing track maintenance and that obscures the failing con-
dition of such roads as Penn Central’s because net income can 
be sustained despite deteriorating roadbeds.”
 It was evident from the analysis that management decision 
making at Penn Central and similar railroads was clouded by 
poorly designed and differentially applied accounting principles 
that allowed the financial problems of the company to be hid-
den. AA felt that more uniformly applied accounting principles 
would have helped with the Penn Central problems, especially 
in the areas of management decision making and regulatory ac-
tions. Though AA did report in the 1973 edition of Accounting 
and Reporting Problems that the ICC had set up an accounting 
study group, nothing apparently came of the endeavor. In the 
face of mounting criticism, the ICC “circled the wagons” and did 
nothing to change its accounting practices, but the economic 
downturns and internal financial problems that would affect the 
health of the rail industry were just around the corner.
 To combat these problems, Congress acted by passing sev-
eral pieces of legislation aimed at deregulating railroads and 
strengthening their financial health. The first of these was the 
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4R 
Act).11 According to the Ford Library [2004], 4R Act provides for 
more efficient, more competitive, and thus less costly rail trans-
portation; increases competition between various kinds of trans-
portation and encourages a better utilization of resources by 
assuring that goods are transported by the most efficient means 
of transportation; eliminates certain antitrust immunities which 
permit carriers to set and hold rates at unreasonably high levels; 
assures that regulation provides adequate protection to consum-
er interests; provides needed financial assistance to the railroad 
industry;12 and encourages speedy and rational restructuring of 
the railroads which will improve their economic health.
 Babcock [1984, p. 4] points out that the Act allowed for the 
“variable cost of rail transport to be recognized as the minimum 
rate.” Under these new rules, “rates equal to or greater than vari-
able cost could not be declared ‘unreasonable’ unless so proven.” 
11This legislation came on the heels of internal criticisms by the staff of the 
ICC itself. An article in the New York Times [1976, p. 2] indicated that, “the Inter-
state Commerce Commission’s enforcement of the law has no overall purpose and 
concentrates on economically insignificant cases.”
12At this time, there was a restructuring within the rail industry that saw the 
development of Amtrak in 1973 and the merger of a number of eastern railroads 
into Conrail in 1975.
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This order ran contrary to the old ICC rate theory that had not 
always allowed for the recapture of fixed costs. In addition, the 
ICC could now eliminate regulation in markets where railroads 
had no “market power” and competed directly with other modes 
of transportation.
 According to the 1976 ICC Reports, one of the lesser-known 
provisions of the Act was to create “a wholesale revision in the 
format and content of the Annual Report R-1” [ICC, 1976, p. 
1598]. The new report, which was to be in effect by January 
1978, was to be more proactive in nature and provide the ICC 
with better revenue and expense data along with “funds flow” in-
formation.13 In addition, the ICC reported that it had conducted 
a new study of depreciation versus betterment accounting. To 
no one’s surprise, it concluded: “The results of the study on the 
Western Maryland Railway showed that the rate base or rate of 
return does not significantly change by application of deprecia-
tion accounting to the track structure” [ICC, 1976, p. 1536]. This 
is similar to the AICPA comments from 1957 that indicated that 
accumulated depreciation applied to railroad structures was 
similar in total to replacement expenses. The ICC did comment 
that there were still problems with the tax consequences of 
betterment accounting as applied to railroads. The ICC [1976, 
p. 1537] now began to see that the end of betterment account-
ing was at hand: “Until the difficulties of changing over from 
betterment accounting are resolved, it cannot ascertain if such 
a changeover would inure to the public benefit. However, the 
Commission should keep apprised of the methodologies used in 
such matters, and conduct depreciation feasibility studies and 
develop depreciation schedules for various accounts.”
 At the end of this portion of the report, it was noted that: 
“[the] Coordinator recommends continued research into the 
updating and upgrading of the Commission’s depreciation data 
base and the process used to analyze depreciation.” Though not 
reported until early 1979, the ICC accepted certain revisions for 
railroad accounts related to provisions in the 4R Act that would 
go into effect in January 1978. One of the first items addressed 
by the new accounting regulation was railroad compliance with 
GAAP, an AA request from nearly 20 years prior. The new regula-
tion quoted from the Act as requiring that accounting systems 
be established that “are in accordance with [GAAP] uniformly 
13Again, the ICC was late in the application of modern accounting methodol-
ogy because it had been nearly 15 years since the Accounting Principles Board 
issued Statement No. 3, The Statement of Source and Application of Funds. 
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applied to all common carriers by railroads subject to this part, 
and all reports shall include any disclosure appropriate under 
generally accepted accounting principles or of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission” [ICC, 1979, p. 125].
 The 4R Act did not have the force of putting the SEC in ac-
tual control of the railroad’s securities regulations, but it had the 
desired effect of taking most reporting requirements out of the 
hands of the ICC after nearly 70 years. Even with this change in 
external reporting, the ICC maintained its stance on RRB and as 
of April 12, 1977, denied a Department of Transportation (DOT) 
petition to change the accounting methods for track structures. 
The DOT, in its petition, took the position that the ICC’s policies 
create an incentive “for railroad management to allow deteriora-
tion of fixed assets” [SEC, 1977, p. 81]. In addition, there was 
no mention of the ban on interperiod tax allocations but for 
methodology on how to deal with some “reversing timing differ-
ences.”
SEC Intervention: In April 1977, the SEC finally entered the fray 
over the RRB issue with a docket ruling against the Burlington 
Northern Railroad. The SEC became concerned about a rash 
of accidents at the railroad and felt that part of the problem lay 
with lax policies regarding track maintenance and replacement. 
It was felt that a lack of disclosure of these policies and their ef-
fect on the company’s income was hurting the investing public. 
The SEC ordered the railroad to make certain disclosures re-
garding these issues, but it did not have the ability to apply this 
order to deal with an industry-wide problem.14 
 The SEC again acted in May 1977 [SEC, 1977] and issued 
preliminary orders regarding the rail industry’s deferred main-
tenance and depreciation disclosures. The impetus seemed to 
come from AA’s original concerns arising from an internal rail 
industry report. This report commented on how replacement 
 cycles in the industry were greater than the average useful lives 
of new rail and ties. This problem concerned the SEC because 
RRB accounting did not fully disclose replacement patterns to 
the shareholders and the markets and, hence, future cash out-
lays. Though the SEC never published final orders on this issue, 
it did take the railroads to task for their accounting policies and 
made it clear to the ICC that it needed to address these prob-
lems. 
14File No. 3-5211, promulgated April 28, 1977 
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The Staggers Act of 1980: Despite the deregulation efforts begun 
by the 4R Act, the railroad industry struggled through high in-
terest rates, high inflation, and the general economic recession 
of the late 1970s. To help mitigate the situation; Congress passed 
the Staggers Act, which reversed nearly a century of “rigid” regu-
lation. It had profound effects on railroads and the ICC:
•	 The ICC no longer had jurisdiction over maximum rail 
rates unless market dominance exists and/or the rate is 
180% or more of variable cost.
•	 As an upgrade to the 4R Act, the ICC no longer had ju-
risdiction over minimum rates as long as they at least 
covered variable cost.
•	 With some stringent limits, the railroads may provide 
contracted rates with specific carriers.15
•	 Again, as an upgrade to 4R Act, the ICC may exempt rail-
roads from markets where they have no market power. 
This represented a change in rules originally designed to 
eliminate market sharing by railroads.
•	 General rate increases may be made quarterly to offset 
the impact of inflation. 
 For the railroads and the ICC, the Staggers Act created a 
new, free-market business environment that the railroads had 
not known for nearly a century. Babcock [1984, p. 6] writes: “the 
Staggers Act permits a great deal of pricing freedom. [To] ensure 
that competitive forces determine rail rates, the Staggers Act se-
verely restricts joint ratemaking. No single-line rail rates may be 
discussed in rate bureaus, and joint rates may be discussed only 
by ‘practicably participating’ carriers.” 
 In response to the regulatory reforms, Odening [1980, p. 66] 
reported in Forbes Magazine that there would be an announce-
ment within the next 12 months that the ICC would begin to al-
low railroads “to capitalize some track costs and then depreciate 
them.” The article went on to explain the now familiar refrain 
from the railroads that the change over to depreciation would 
be costly both in terms of the switch-over costs (estimated in 
excess of $300 million industry-wide) and in terms of higher 
“cash-based” taxes resulting from the new, and presumably 
lower, “non-cash” expenses. Finally, the report indicated that 
Congress was about to act to remedy the situation by legisla-
tion that would “freeze the manner in which industry taxes are 
calculated.” Congress, in essence, was assuming that a lower 
15This was a practice outlawed by the original Interstate Commerce Act of 
1887.
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tax bill for the industry would give the railroads an incentive to 
finance more maintenance and replacement of track. The indus-
try had mixed emotions with respect to this assumption, but the 
article reported that the market was “cautiously bullish about 
the proposed accounting change.” 
 The proposed legislation discussed in Forbes turned out to 
be quite different in nature than expected and came in the form 
of Public Law 96-613, Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, which 
President Carter signed into law on the eve of his departure from 
office. Surprisingly, the bill turned out to be supportive of the 
industry’s position on betterment accounting and had the effect 
of specifically making the methodology legally acceptable for 
federal income tax purposes. From the industry’s myopic point 
of view, the need for this legislation was clear – institutionalize 
RRB in the tax code before it was banned. 
 The swift reaction of the industry to the potential account-
ing change reported by the ICC and supported by the Staggers 
Act changes showed that the railroad industry continued to have 
a considerable amount of political influence. Conversely, the 
ICC’s proposed change may have been a “trial balloon,” designed 
to galvanize industry reaction and protect RRB. In the end, the 
sweeping railroad regulation reforms and some partisan tax leg-
islation seemed to have two major effects. First, it created a new 
environment whereby the need for an ICC now became suspect. 
Second, and more ironically, the law had the effect of nearly 
derailing accounting reforms as the ICC, now mortally wounded 
due to the mandate of the Staggers Act that rate targets be de-
veloped using RRB-based numbers, institutionalized RRB-tax 
deductions. Any new accounting reforms by the ICC seemed to 
be dead on arrival, but not before the IRS had its say. 
The GAO Study: While Congress began debating new tax legisla-
tion for 1981, it directed the GAO to review the accounting and 
reporting practices of the ICC and the railroads. On February 4, 
1981, the comptroller general issued a 51-page report entitled, 
Accounting Changes Needed in the Railroad Industry. The report’s 
executive summary [GAO, 1981, p. iii] stated the following:
In contrast to other industries, which use depreciation 
accounting for capital assets, railroads used a unique 
betterment accounting method for their track struc-
tures. GAO believes the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
should require railroads to adopt depreciation account-
ing. This would enhance the comparability of railroad’s 
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financial reporting, assist the Congress in deliberations 
on regulatory reform and financial assistance to rail-
roads, and provide better information for shippers and 
small investors. Railroads should also include informa-
tion on their maintenance and replacement practices 
including deferred maintenance, in financial reports. 
 The three primary arguments for depreciation account-
ing set forth by the GAO again mirror those first brought into 
question by AA nearly a quarter century before. The first GAO 
argument for depreciation was, of course, improved expense 
recognition. Second, the GAO felt that it provided improved bal-
ance sheet presentation. Finally, the enhanced comparability of 
financial information would help Congress and other users of 
the information make better decisions. The new depreciation 
standards would help coordinate the efforts of regulators and 
the markets and, by extension, the management of the railroads 
as well, especially in the area of capital improvements and safety 
concerns.
 Though convinced that depreciation accounting was su-
perior, the GAO study, using data provided by the industry, 
pointed out the major problem that, with a change in account-
ing methods, there was every indication that net income would 
be substantially higher, as much as 35% [GAO, 1981, p. 21].16 
Higher reported net income should have been good news for any 
company, but for a railroad industry that had followed unsound 
ICC accounting practices for three quarters of a century, there 
would be no expense shield, leading inevitably to increased taxes 
and a cash outlay that struggling roads would find difficult to 
absorb. It was clear from the report that any change in deprecia-
tion recognition would need a corresponding change in the tax 
code. This lead to the GAO’s response to the passage of Public 
Law 96-613 on December 28, 1980: “There is no reason that 
the railroads cannot use betterment accounting for income tax 
purposes and depreciation accounting for financial reporting 
purposes” [GAO, 1981, p. 19, fn.]. 
 In the end, it appears that from 1976 through 1980, the ICC 
changed its tack to preserve betterment accounting by focusing 
on the presumed detrimental cash flows for the railroads. The 
16The GAO [1981, pp. 22-23] study had to admit that the income studies came 
from the railroads and the ICC and were not verified for their reliability. The idea 
that income would be that much higher could only occur if the railroads were ac-
tually making scheduled replacements of track. Evidence pointed to the fact that 
this was not really happening. 
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ICC knew the change was coming and tried to postpone it until 
the actual decision was out of its hands, resulting from either 
a tax code change or some legal remedy. The GAO [1981, p. iv] 
commented that, “the ICC agrees that adopting depreciation ac-
counting would benefit financial statement users. However, the 
ICC has been concerned that the accounting change would in-
crease Federal income taxes and undermine the financial stabil-
ity of even the healthiest railroads. ICC has been waiting for the 
tax issue to be resolved before further considering the adoption 
of depreciation accounting for track structures.” 
 From a regulatory point of view, the final obstacles for the 
switch to depreciation were Staggers Act problems associated 
with the calculations of income and return targets for rate pric-
ing based on betterment accounting data. The Staggers Act, 
however, turned out to be more “flexible” than anticipated, pav-
ing the way for the final changing of the accounting procedures 
[ICC, 1984, p. 158]. The venue for the final changes moved from 
the ICC and the GAO to the U.S. Congress as it debated tax leg-
islation that would spur a faltering economy. Congress had to 
again deal with problems related to railroad health and, in so 
doing, had to address the question of tax deductions that would 
promote capital recovery in the industry.
TAX REFORM AND THE END OF  
BETTERMENT ACCOUNTING
The Early Use of RRB for Tax Purposes: Since the ICC institution-
alized RRB in the early 20th century, the federal government 
had given tacit consent to its use of income tax assessments for 
businesses. For example, the U.S. Treasury Department accepted 
the use of RRB for determining income for tax purposes. Ac-
cording to Coughlan and Strand [1969, p. 24], some of the first 
regulations establishing RRB for track structures, when taxing 
authorities concurred, permitted “a reasonable allowance for 
the exhaustion, wear and tear, including a reasonable allowance 
for obsolescence, of property used in a trade or business or held 
for production of income.”
 Over the following decades, the IRS commissioner contin-
ued to support its use for tax purposes.17 For example, Sec. 41 of 
the 1939 Code provided support for consistency in the general 
rule for methods of accounting by indicating that:
17See The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, 64 TC 352 (1975) for a 
formal discussion of the commissioner’s approval.
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The net income shall be computed upon the basis of the 
taxpayer’s annual accounting period … in accordance 
with the method of accounting regularly employed 
in keeping the books of such taxpayer; but if no such 
method of accounting has been so employed, or if the 
method employed does not clearly reflect the income, 
the computation shall be made in accordance with such 
method as in the opinion of the Commissioner does 
clearly reflect the income.
 The Board of Tax Appeals in Central Railroad Company of 
New Jersey v. Commissioner [35 B.T.A. 501 (1937)] also recog-
nized the commissioner’s power: “[the commissioner] is given 
discretionary power to determine the effectiveness of the taxpay-
er’s method of accounting for use in computing taxable net in-
come, and, if the method does not clearly reflect the income, the 
statute directs him to make the computation by such method as 
in his opinion does clearly reflect the income.”
 The Supreme Court also addressed the use of regulatory 
accounting methods for federal income tax in the Old Colony 
Railroad Company v. Commissioner [3 USTC 880, (1932)] deci-
sion. The issue in this case related to the inclusion in taxable 
income of a later year part of bond premium received before 
March 1, 1913. The ICC required the Old Colony Railroad Com-
pany to amortize the bond premium over the respective lives of 
the bonds. The IRS commissioner asserted that the same treat-
ment should apply for tax purposes. The Court did comment on 
the weight of ICC rulings on computing taxable income, saying 
that “the rules of accounting enforced upon a carrier by the In-
terstate Commerce Commission are not binding upon the com-
missioner, nor may he resort to the rules of that body, made for 
other purposes, for the determination of tax liability under the 
revenue acts.”
 Over 40 years after the decision in the Old Colony case, the 
Supreme Court again considered the use of regulatory account-
ing in Idaho Power Co. v. Commissioner [74-2 USTC 9521]. The 
Court’s comments describe the attitudes of the commissioner 
and the railroads during the 1913-1954 period regarding the 
acceptance of certain accounting procedures. While the IRS 
commissioner was not required to accept the RRB method of 
accounting, he approved of its use. In the course of time, sev-
eral railroad companies18 attempted to recognize depreciation 
18See Central Railroad Company of New Jersey v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 501 
(1937) and Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company v. Commissioner, 40-2 
USTC 9583 (CA-7) (1940).
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charges using the straight-line method on part of their property. 
In each case, the commissioner required the use of the RRB 
method. The courts decided in favor of the commissioner in 
each case by pointing out that taxpayer railroads had not ob-
tained the permission of the commissioner before changing to 
the straight-line method.
The Commissioner’s Continued Approval of RRB during the 
1960s: At the same time AA and the AICPA were struggling with 
the theoretical underpinnings of RRB, the IRS was enhancing 
its recognition of the method through a series of rulings starting 
with Revenue Ruling 67-22 [1967-1 CB 52]. Though this ruling 
dealt with a narrow issue related to track welds, it did help to 
explain RRB’s general application and, in doing so, gave a posi-
tive assent to its use. Essentially, the ruling indicated that RRB 
represents a rough equivalent to depreciation accounting in 
track.19 
 This argument bolstered both the ICC’s and the AICPA’s 
opinion that RRB had authoritative support. Two additional 
rulings [Rev. Rul. 70-163, 1970-1 CB 43; Rev. Rul. 73-135, 1973-
1 CB 80] further defined the extent of allowable RRB deduc-
tions in lieu of a depreciation charge. Even when a railroad 
replaced a substantial portion of its railroad track during 1966 
and 1967, Revenue Ruling 73-135 held that deductions under 
the retirement method resulted in a reasonable allowance for 
depreciation where “the taxpayer has consistently employed the 
retirement method of accounting and has maintained continu-
ously a regular and consistent practice of handling retirements 
and replacements.” 
 Though not explicitly mentioned, it is clear that the IRS 
was watching the railroads for “income management” through 
increasing replacements in years of higher earnings and limited 
replacements in low-income years, a problem that would not 
occur under a more traditional definition of depreciation. Ac-
cording to AA [1962a, p. 132], a 1931 ICC report highlighted this 
particular earnings management problem with RRB accounting. 
19According to the ruling, “depreciation” comes from: [1] the cost of replace-
ments in kind and quality less the salvage value of the materials recovered; [2] the 
cost of the uncapitalized portion of replacements where betterments are involved, 
less the salvage value of the materials recovered; [3] the capitalized cost of retire-
ments without replacements the salvage value of the materials recovered; and [4] 
the labor costs incurred in retirements and replacements.
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The Application of Railroad Depreciation and the 1954 Code: In 
1954, a new tax code replaced the earlier 1939 edition. Regard-
less of the ICC’s capitalization rules for railroads, the general 
rules for depreciation in Sec. 167(a) of the 1954 Code remained 
similar to those of 1939 with no specific mention of RRB. The 
new code, however, did have one major change; it allowed the 
use of accelerated methods to calculate depreciation deductions. 
In addition, the general rules for methods of accounting in Sec. 
446(a) of the 1954 Code were also similar to 1939, providing 
that “taxable income shall be computed under the method of ac-
counting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes 
his income in keeping his books.” Such language bolstered ICC 
claims that RRB was an accepted standard, but it left many rail-
roads unable to recapture investment costs.
 With the new code, some railroads made renewed efforts to 
use depreciation methods other than the RRB method for tax 
purposes. Several railroad companies first attempted to deduct 
depreciation on lines that were about to be abandoned. The 
commissioner rejected these attempts and required that the tax-
payers continue to deduct depreciation as retirement or aban-
donment actually occurred. The courts sided with the commis-
sioner regarding rails and like assets. However, some railroad 
companies found success in deducting depreciation for costs 
in the specific areas of grading and tunnel bores which, before 
1969, were only deductible in the year of actual retirement. After 
1968, Sec. 167(a), IRC provided for “a depreciation deduction a 
reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (includ-
ing a reasonable allowance for obsolescence)…These assets are 
not subject to exhaustion due to wear and tear but could eventu-
ally become obsolete.” 
 The difficulty for the railroads was in ascertaining a reason-
able and determinable useful life for the asset, a problem they 
would also face if RRB were ever phased out. In some cases, 
the taxpayers attempted to deduct depreciation of grading and 
tunnel bores that were placed into service in prior years based 
on a service life that was calculated using projected obsoles-
cence. These cases seemed to relate to tax years beginning in the 
mid-to-late 1950s, ending in the early 1960s. The railroads went 
on to use statistical methods to predict future obsolescence.
 For example, the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway (C&O) [64 
TC 352 (1975)] claimed that it should be allowed to take depre-
ciation deductions for the years 1954 through 1963 for its tunnel 
bores because the determinable useful lives of the assets were 
not more than 50 years because of foreseeable obsolescence. 
24
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 34 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol34/iss1/4
49Heier and Gurley: Railroad Accounting
The Court held that the C&O could deduct depreciation of its 
grading and tunnel bores over a fifty-year period and indicated 
that its decision was consistent with the 1969 Tax Reform Act, 
Sec. 185 that allowed railroad companies to amortize the cost of 
grading and tunnel bores first placed into service after 1968.
 Using the C&O case as a guide, several railroads were suc-
cessful in obtaining depreciation deductions for grading and/or 
tunnel bores by providing convincing evidence of useful lives.20 
By way of contrast, the Spartanburg Terminal Co. [66 TC 916, 
1976, 1982] relied on the C&O decision but failed to establish a 
reasonable useful life for its assets and was denied a deduction 
for a depreciation charge. In Burlington Northern Inc. v. U.S. 
[82-1 USTC 9250], the Court of Claims also considered the issue 
of depreciation deductions in the mid-1950s for railroad grading 
and tunnel bores. The evidence provided by expert witnesses 
did not convince the Court as to the validity of the estimates 
of useful lives, and it denied the deductions. Subsequently, the 
Tax Reform Act of 1976 added an election to amortize pre-1969 
railroad grading and tunnel bores over a fifty-year period for 
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1974. One conse-
quence of the election under Sec. 185 was that it barred deduc-
tions at the time of retirement or abandonment of a railroad 
grading or tunnel bore. The amortization of the costs, however, 
would continue.21
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981: During this time of 
heavy litigation over such arcane matters as tunnels bores, most 
railroads continued to use RRB for track structures when com-
puting taxable income. Changes in the methodology, though, 
would be coming with the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 
that classified track structures under the Accelerated Cost Re-
covery System as five-year property. 
 Williams [1981a, p. 35], a reporter for the WSJ, wrote that 
the 1981 changes in depreciation of track structures provided 
20Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 75 TC 497 (1980), Kansas City Southern 
Railway Co., 76 TC 1067 (1981), Seaboard Coastline Railroad Co., 54 TCM 1334 
(1987), and Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co., 54 TCM 1352 (1987)
21The Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed Section 185 for property additions af-
ter December 31, 1986. The House Report [1986, p. 174] explained that Congress 
enacted the special amortization provision for railroad grading and tunnel bore 
expenditures in 1969 to encourage investment in light of uncertainties about the 
useful life of such property. The scope of the provision was extended in 1976 to 
cover expenditures for pre-1969 property. The committee believed that continua-
tion of the benefit was inconsistent with tax reform.
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railroads with the ability to reap substantial tax savings. An 
estimated $1.5 billion in tax benefits was projected for 1981 if 
all railroads elected the most accelerated depreciation method. 
The article went on to say that there was some concern that the 
railroads, which paid only $600 million in taxes for 1980, would 
not be able to use all of the deductions. Presumably, they would 
have been able to obtain tax refunds from prior years by carry-
ing back net operating losses. In a related story, the WSJ [1981, 
p. 35] noted that the continuing shortsightedness hurt the rail 
industry by not taking full advantage of the provisions in the 
same tax act. The article specifically noted that the rail industry 
had “neglected” to order enough new rolling stock (boxcars) to 
take advantage of the newly “reinstituted” investment tax credit. 
The article then noted that, “railroad officials felt sensitive about 
the topic but a well-placed industry source confirms that rail-
roads, for economic reasons, missed a chance for one type of 
windfall under the tax law change.” The myopia of the industry 
and that of the regulators continued.
The ICC Ends RRB Accounting: After the GAO issued its report 
and before Congress passed the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 
1981, the ICC announced in March 1981 that it had instructed 
the railroads to perform certain depreciation studies. These 
industry studies and others finally put the ICC on a fast track to-
wards changing its basis for track structure accounting. Fahren-
wald [1981, pp. 11, 15] reported in Railway Age that the ICC now 
“feels that the time may have arrived to do away with RRB.” 
The article pointed out many of the same arguments against the 
change as the GAO report, especially in the area of higher taxes, 
but a Mr. Holmes, an ICC accounting systems researcher, indi-
cated in an interview that RRB accounting:
… is all well and good while the track is being main-
tained. But, if track replacements are being deferred 
you’ll be charging too little to operating expenses. If 
suddenly you accelerated your replacements, you’ll be 
charging too much to operating expense. When you 
replace the track, it gives recognition [in an account-
ing sense] to the track’s deterioration. But replacement 
doesn’t always occur in uniform manner – though dete-
rioration usually does.
 After 25 years, the ICC began to understand AA’s original 
arguments for depreciating track structures to match revenues 
and expenses better. The article ended with Holmes comment-
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ing: “On [the] one hand there’s a bunch of railroads that like 
it, but they’re getting money from the government [and prefer 
higher earnings]. Other railroads are more concerned from a tax 
point. It’s up to us to come to a decision separate from all that.” 
This last point was the central thrust of the GAO’s argument that 
depreciation needed to be required regardless of the short-term 
tax effects on the railroads.
 After years of debate, on January 26, 1983, the Commission 
voted to change the method of accounting for railroad track 
structure from RRB to depreciation accounting. The ICC [1984, 
p. 158] explained, “after reviewing comments, we have decided 
that track structure should no longer be treated differently from 
other assets for accounting purposes.” It went on to say: “We 
have concluded that, because depreciation accounting [unlike 
RRB] related cost consumption to the utilization of assets over 
time, it should be used for all assets except land.” The concept of 
cost matching had finally taken hold. In a symbolic, last effort to 
defend RRB, however, the ICC report [1984, p. 158] averred: “We 
recognize that historical depreciation accounting fails to reflect 
the impact of inflation. But, depreciation accounting can be 
based on inflation-adjusted costs and can thereby reflect the im-
pact of inflation.” The ICC after 75 years had changed its policy 
but apparently not its long-held opinions.
 Even though the Commission had voted for the change, it 
would not make the official announcement for another month. 
In the meantime, the WSJ ran several articles on the topic. In 
the first article, published on February 4, 1983 [WSJ, 1983b, p. 
3], the WSJ mentioned that the ICC “has been trying for about 
four years to decide whether to let railroads use depreciation 
accounting for all their capital expenditures. Impetus for ap-
proving depreciation accounting came from a 1981 tax law that 
permitted roads to use the methods in earnings reports to the 
Internal Revenue Service.” The article also speculated that earn-
ings of railroads reported to stockholders could increase by as 
much as 20%. 
 In a follow-up article, Paul [1983, p. 4] reported the poten-
tial “paper profits” that the railroads would generate with the 
accounting change. This article included several interviews with 
railroad executives. Their opinion of the change varied from 
mild support to utter contempt. A CSX executive was quoted as 
saying that a railroad’s “annual costs would decrease and profit 
would increase – but only on paper. This doesn’t add one penny 
of cash to the railroad.” The rail industry executives then slipped 
into their old arguments against the change and indicated de-
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preciation accounting could “hinder efforts to secure federal ap-
proval of proposed rate increases and could force some lines to 
pay higher state income and property taxes.” One Southern Rail-
way executive said that, “we’re going to be fair game for unions 
and stockholders.” However, several other executives quoted in 
the article took a contrary view of the situation and said that 
depreciation accounting is probably better than existing meth-
ods because railroads would not have to continue the practice 
of deferring track replacement. In the end, it was hoped that in-
vestors would see the benefit of the change, “once railroads are 
reporting profit on the same basis as other corporations.” 
 Finally, the WSJ [1983a, p. 3] announced that the ICC had 
indeed required the change. According to the article, the change 
“will boost [the] roads’ reported profits.” This article then at-
tempted to explain the theoretical difference between RRB and 
depreciation accounting. It reported that the railroads would 
begin using the same depreciation accounting for track struc-
tures as they had been using for equipment costs. To this point, 
track improvement costs were “written off in the year they were 
incurred.” The article then explained, “the current method re-
sults in showing higher costs within the year an investment (ac-
tually replacement) is made and thus lower profits reported to 
the ICC. But the adoption of depreciation accounting will have 
the reverse effect, reducing costs and inflating reported profits 
when track improvements occur.” In its final analysis, the article 
revealed the central problem that caused the railroads to delay 
any change as follows: 
Under a 1981 law, railroads for tax purposes have had 
to use depreciation accounting for track work. Although 
the Securities and Exchange Commission suggested us-
ing the same approach for reports to stockholders, and 
to the public, only a few roads have done so. Some 
roads fear that doing so would boost pressure for them 
to raise wages and dividends and make it harder to get 
the ICC to approve freight rate increases. It is estimated 
the change will boost profits shown by railroads as 
much as 20%.22 
22Evidence of the tax problems (in reverse) appeared as the Burlington North-
ern “reported net income, restated for changes in its method of oil and gas ac-
counting, of $146.6 million, or $1.76 a share. The year-ago net, if adjusted for 
changes in railroad depreciation which don’t require a formal restatement, would 
have resulted in a pro forma profit of $138 million, or $1.63 a share” [Wells, 1986, 
p. 1].
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 It appears from the article that even though the railroads 
were already reporting depreciation to the IRS, they were still 
leery of capricious ICC regulators and the market dynamics 
of the change. Those problems were now ending with the de 
facto deregulation of the industry. Regardless of the railroad’s 
(and the ICC’s) final opinion on RRB, the theoretical basis of 
the matching principle had won out after all. After 75 years of 
official sanction, and probably 150 years of industry usage, bet-
terment accounting had met an ignominious end from the same 
bureaucratic organization that had defended it so long. With the 
ICC also relenting on the issue of deferred taxes in March 1983, 
railroad accounting finally came into harmonization with other 
U.S. industry practices.
THE LAST WORD
 After nearly 30 years, Leonard Spacek’s concerns pertaining 
to the “divergency” in railroad accounting principles could be 
put to rest. In the course of his arguments, however, he and his 
firm unknowingly put forth a set of principles that explained the 
need for the convergence of accounting standards based on clear 
accounting principles that would be theoretically sound, compa-
rable between companies, transparent in their understanding, 
and useful for both managers and investors to use for decision 
making. 
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